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Abstract  
Liability of internet intermediaries for content created by third parties is a contentious area of 
defamation law. Recently, the law in New Zealand has begun to depart from English law, and move 
closer to strict liability. Parliament has responded with a ‘safe harbour’ in clause 20 of the Harmful 
Digital Communications Bill, which will provide online content hosts with conditional immunity from 
liability for content created by others. The author supports the creation of a legislative safe harbour for 
internet intermediaries, but highlights a number of deficiencies with clause 20 as currently drafted. This 
paper analyses the existing law, including possible defences, and clause 20. It also looks to other 
jurisdictions’ safe harbours, and concludes with recommendations on how clause 20 ought to be 
improved. 
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I Introduction  
The Harmful Digital Communications Bill, currently before Parliament, reforms the 
liability of online content hosts for defamatory content created by third parties: it 
provides what is commonly called a ‘safe harbour’, giving hosts immunity from civil 
and criminal actions in respect of content created by others. The provision has 
potentially far-reaching effects, and particularly so in the field of defamation, which is 
therefore this paper’s focus in analysing the provision. 
A Issues and structure of this paper  
After introducing the law of defamation, this paper will discuss the Bill’s safe harbour 
regime. This will involve looking at what it is in its current form, and what it was 
before changes were made following the Select Committee’s recommendations. The 
clause, as initially drafted, had significant deficiencies that could restrict freedom of 
expression by incentivising the quick removal of content complained of. The Select 
Committee made several recommendations, which were adopted by the Minister, but 
there are still a number of issues with the provision. 
The paper will then look to the prior law on online content hosts’ liability for third 
party defamation to see how the Bill fits in and what it will change. Case law has been 
confused, particularly with respect to the separate questions of whether a defendant is 
a publisher for the purposes of defamation liability, and whether the defendant can 
avail itself of the defence of innocent dissemination. Notably, recent New Zealand 
cases have begun to move away from the English law, towards stricter liability in 
respect of third party defamation. 
The paper also argues that the Bill’s safe harbour may not apply to search engines, 
and that Parliament should clarify that search engines are covered. 
Finally, the paper will consider the importance of giving internet intermediaries 
immunity, and will look to foreign jurisdictions and make recommendations on how 
the Bill should be improved. It will particularly focus on the United Kingdom’s 
Defamation Act 2013 and the United States’ Communications Decency Act 1996. 
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B Background to defamation law  
People are generally entitled to their reputation, and have a right to claim that their 
reputation should not be disparaged by defamatory statements made about them 
without lawful justification or excuse.1 Defamation is a private legal remedy, the 
objects of which are to vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation and provide compensation 
for injury to reputation.2 The application of the law of defamation to situations in 
which the defamatory material was authored not by the defendant but by a third party 
has been contentious, especially so in the context of internet intermediaries. 
II The Proposal for Reform  
The Harmful Digital Communications Bill3 (the Bill) was introduced by Hon Judith 
Collins on 5 November 2013. It contains a number of amendments to the law, and 
notably cl 20 provides what is commonly called a ‘safe harbour’ for online content 
hosts, supplemented by cl 20A. This safe harbour is conditional, but will apply very 
broadly, to any civil or criminal proceedings,4 with only a few specified exceptions. 
Clause 20(2) provides that: 
“No civil or criminal proceedings may be brought against the online 
content host in respect of the content complained of (the specific 
content)”. 
“Online content host” is defined in the Act as the person who has control over the part 
of the electronic retrieval system, such as a website or online application, on which 
the communication is posted and accessible by the user.5 Thus the basis of application 
is control over the relevant part of the site or application, so it is clear that the 
provision will apply to operators of websites, blogs, Facebook pages and similar 
platforms. 
This paper’s analysis is limited to the clauses’ application to defamation law, but it is 
important to note that the provision will apply to similar causes of action such as 
                                                        
1 Laws of New Zealand Defamation at [1]. 
2 At [1]. 
3 Harmful Digital Communications Bill 2013 (168-2) [HDCB]. 
4 Clause 20(2). 
5 Clause 4. 
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breach of confidence and the invasion of privacy tort from the Hosking v Runting line 
of cases, as well as negligence; it will also presumably apply beyond common law 
torts, for example to liability under the Fair Trading Act 1986.6 Such consequences 
are beyond the scope of this article. 
The paper’s focus is on defamation for two main reasons: first, defamation is the 
cause of action likely to be most affected, in that the tort has increasingly been used in 
respect of content created by third parties and posted online; and secondly, it is clear 
from the Bill’s legislative history that cl 20 is primarily a response to two recent court 
decisions on defamation, which are discussed in part III below: Karam v Parker, and 
Wishart v Murray.7 
A The original notice and takedown regime  
Initially the safe harbour took a form that could be called a simple ‘notice-takedown’ 
model. In essence, an online content host would receive protection from civil and 
criminal liability provided it takes reasonable steps as soon as is reasonably 
practicable to remove content complained of. 
The principal problem with this approach is that it incentivises the hasty removal of 
complained-of content by hosts, leading to restrictions on free speech. The notice of 
complaint was required to explain why the complainant considers that the specific 
content is unlawful, or otherwise ought to be taken down because it is harmful or 
objectionable. However, no required standard was specified, and there was no 
provision for the host to receive immunity should it weigh up the complaint and 
decide to leave the content in place – it could only attain immunity under the Act by 
taking reasonable steps to remove content about which it has received a complaint. 
Similarly, there was no way for an author of the content to challenge the complaint. 
Consequently, content hosts would be likely to remove content in order to attain 
protection under cl 20, regardless of whether the complaint is well grounded.  
                                                        
6 Auckland District Law Society Inc “Submission to the Justice and Electoral Committee on the 
Harmful Digital Communications Bill 2013” at [21]. 
7 (14 November 2013) 694 NZPD 14747. 
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Although no s 7 report has been issued by the Attorney-General, the Ministry of 
Justice considered the original clause to comply with the Bill of Rights Act 1990, for 
three reasons.8 First, the decision of a private provider of communications services to 
accept or delete communications has been held to fall beyond the Bill of Rights Act. 
Secondly, there is already an incentive for content hosts to refrain from hosting or 
retaining potentially offensive communications, given the risk of liability. Thirdly, 
there is Court of Appeal authority that a statutory immunity from liability does not 
engage Bill of Rights obligations because it does not constitute performance of a 
public function, power or duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or 
pursuant to law. Unfortunately, no further explanation or citation was given. 
B The notice and takedown regime now  
Several changes were made to the procedure that online content hosts must follow in 
order to be protected by safe harbour, following recommendations by the Justice and 
Electoral Committee. In essence, the provision now requires that the host, as soon as 
possible but in any event within 48 hours of receiving a complaint,9 must provide the 
author of the content with a copy of the notice of complaint, 10 and notify the author 
that the author may submit a counter-notice to the host within 48 hours after receiving 
that notification.11 
From there, the action the host must take will vary, depending on which eventuality 
occurs. First, if the host is unable to contact the author after taking reasonable steps to 
do so, the host must take down or disable the specific content as soon as practicable.12 
Secondly, if the author submits a valid counter-notice within 48 hours after receiving 
the host’s notification, in which the author consents to the removal of the specific 
content, the host must take down or disable the specific content as soon as 
practicable.13 
                                                        
8 Ben Keith and Helen Carrad Harmful Digital Communications Bill (PCO 16465/4.17): Consistency 
with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Ministry of Justice Advice to the Attorney-General, 
2013). 
9 HDCB, above n 3, cl 20(3)(a). 
10 Clause 20(3)(a)(i). 
11 Clause 20(3)(a)(ii). 
12 Clause 20(3)(b). 
13 Clause 20(3)(c). 
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Thirdly, if the author submits a valid counter-notice in which the author refuses to 
consent to the removal of the specific content, the host must leave the specific content 
in place and, as soon as practicable, 14  notify the complainant of the author’s 
decision.15 If the author consents, the host must also provide the complainant with 
personal information that identifies the author.16 
Lastly, if the author does not submit a valid counter-notice in accordance with the 
provisions, the host must take down or disable the specific content as soon as 
practicable but no later than 48 hours after notifying the author.17  
In any event, the host must provide an easily accessible mechanism that enables a user 
to contact the host about content.18  
The changes stem from a Ministry of Justice Departmental Report, which highlights 
the potential for the original cl 20 to be misused, and the incentive for hosts to remove 
content complained about.19 The Ministry said that no alternative models considered 
were entirely suitable,20  and that the model eventually adopted strikes a balance 
between the timely removal of harmful content, the rights of authors of content and 
the freedom of expression, and the need for a model that is technically workable.21 
Legislative reform should be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act 1990, so any 
restriction on freedom of expression should only be “such reasonable limits … as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. 22 As mentioned already, 
the Ministry of Justice considered the original cl 20 to be consistent with the Act. As 
now drafted, the clause is arguably even more consistent with s 14, because it does 
not give online content hosts an incentive to hastily remove content, thus lessening 
interference with freedom of expression.  
                                                        
14 HDCB, above n 3, cl 20(3)(d). 
15 Clause 20(3)(d)(i). 
16 Clause 20(3)(d)(ii). 
17 Clause 20(3)(e). 
18 Clause 20(6). 
19 Ministry of Justice Harmful Digital Communications Bill – Departmental Report for the Justice 
and Electoral Committee (13 April 2014) at [287]. 
20 At [306]. 
21 At [314]. 
22 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
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However, the Bill contains a number of deficiencies. The first is that search engine 
operators may not be covered by cl 20, under the provision’s current wording. The 
second is that complainants may be left without a timely remedy, because the author 
can choose not to let the host pass on the author’s details to the complainant. There 
are additional changes that should be made, to improve the safe harbour. These are 
discussed under part V below. 
In order to provide context, I now turn to the law of defamation for third party content 
as it currently stands. 
III Current Position  
There are two key issues in the question of whether an online content host can be 
liable for defamatory material created by a third party: first, whether the host is a 
“publisher” of the material for the purposes of defamation; and secondly, whether the 
host can avail itself of a defence, most relevantly the defence of innocent 
dissemination, which in New Zealand is codified in s 21 of the Defamation Act 1992. 
While these are distinct issues, the common law is somewhat murky because judges 
have not always clearly distinguished between them. This stems from the 
foundational case of Byrne, below, which departed from the tort’s strict liability 
nature in respect of third party defamation. 
A General law as to publishers  
What constitutes publication is very broad: the communication of a defamatory 
statement to any person besides the subject of the statement. 23  The traditional 
common law doctrine is that liability extends to anyone who participated in, secured 
or authorised the publication,24 subject to the defence of innocent dissemination. 
Defamation is a strict liability tort, and Patteson J in Day v Bream said that a 
defendant is prima facie liable even if he had no knowledge of the contents of the 
publication.25 
                                                        
23 Pullman v Walter Hill & Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 524 (QB) at 527. 
24 Mahfouz v Brisard [2005] EWHC 2304 (QB) at [11]. 
25 Day v Bream (1837) 174 ER 212 (Assizes) at [56]. 
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B Whether internet intermediaries can be publishers of third party content  
The leading authority26 on liability for third party defamation is the English case of 
Byrne v Deane (Byrne).27 In that case, the Court held that the defendants, having 
control over their noticeboard, were publishers of defamatory material posted on it by 
a third party. The Court reasoned that by knowing of the defamatory material, having 
the power to remove it and failing to do so, they can properly be inferred to have 
taken responsibility for its continued publication.28 This departs from the normally 
strict liability nature of the tort. 
It is worth noting that, in the context of online material, publication itself occurs 
where and when the offending statement is downloaded and read.29 
As discussed below, case law reveals diverging views on whether knowledge of the 
defamatory material is necessary, as in the Byrne case, or whether it is not necessary, 
in line with the strict liability nature of the tort. As noted, this may stem from a failure 
to understand the distinction between being a publisher (which is defined broadly 
enough that even librarians have been held to be) and being an innocent disseminator, 
which carries a defence. 
I will look separately at liability of online content hosts, and liability of search 
engines. 
1 Liability of online content hosts  
(a) England and Wales  
Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd (Demon)30 is, on its facts, an application of the Byrne 
approach to an online bulletin board operator. The Court held that the defendant, a 
Usenet bulletin board provider, was not just a conduit, because it hosted and 
transmitted the offending material and could delete it if it wished;31 thus it published 
                                                        
26 Matthew Collins The Law of Defamation and the Internet (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2011) at [6.22]. 
27 Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818 [Byrne]. 
28 At 838. 
29 Solicitor-General v Siemer HC Auckland CIV 2008-202, 8 July 2008 at [70]. 
30 Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd [2001] QB 201, [1999] 4 ER 342 (QB) [Godfrey]. 
31 At 209. 
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users’ postings when it transmitted the information to viewers. 32  Morland J 
considered the defendant to be analogous to a bookseller and library.33 Interestingly, 
he considered that the defendant could be liable even if it was not aware of the 
defamatory material, on the basis that liability for the publication of defamatory 
material was strict at common law, and there was still publication even if the 
publisher was ignorant of the defamatory material within the document.34 This obiter 
dictum departs from the reasoning in Byrne, and is more consistent with the 
foundations of the tort. 
Tamiz v Google Inc (Tamiz)35 took a different approach, more closely following and 
endorsing the Byrne line of authority.36 The Court considered that Google, in respect 
of its Blogger.com service, was analogous to a noticeboard provider, in that it gave 
creators tools to make their posts. Google could set the terms of use, and readily block 
access for violation of such terms. Thus it would be a publisher once it had received 
notification.37 The Court doubted that Google was a publisher prior to notification of 
the defamatory material, since it cannot be said that Google either knew or ought to 
have known of the defamatory comments.38 
Davison v Habeeb & Ors (Davison)39 also concerned Google’s Blogger.com service, 
and held that Google was not just a passive facilitator, but rather the provider of a 
giant noticeboard;40 it has control, and can take notices down.41 But the Court said 
that due to the volume of use, Google should not be considered liable for continued 
publication until after notification and failure to remove the defamatory material.42 
 
 
                                                        
32 Godfrey, above n 30, at 208-209. 
33 At 209. 
34 At 207. 
35 Tamiz v Google Inc [2013] 1 WLR 2151 (CA) [Tamiz]. 
36 At [34]. 
37 At [34]. 
38 At [26]. 
39 Davison v Habeeb & Ors [2011] EWHC 3013 (QB) [Davison]. 
40 At [41]. 
41 At [38]. 
42 At [47]. 
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(b) New Zealand  
Sadiq v Baycorp (NZ) Ltd (Sadiq)43 was the first case in New Zealand to consider the 
liability of an internet intermediary for third party defamation. The defendant had the 
ability to remove defamatory material posted on its website, but failed to take any 
measures to do so after requested to by the plaintiff.44 The Court essentially applied 
the Byrne approach, holding that there was an arguable case that the defendant was a 
publisher of the material.45  
Associate Judge Doogue considered knowledge to be necessary, saying that “[t]here 
would need to be evidence that some human agent of the defendant adverted to the 
presence of the statement on the website and nonetheless took no steps for its 
removal”.46 
Wishart v Murray (Wishart)47 considered whether the creator of a Facebook page 
could be held liable for defamatory content posted on the page by other users. The 
defendant had the ability to control content by deleting posts and blocking individual 
users from the page.48  
Courtney J drew an analogy with the noticeboard in Byrne: the host of a Facebook 
page is essentially creating a noticeboard, on which anyone can post comments.49 She 
said that “[t]hose who host Facebook pages or similar are not passive instruments or 
mere conduits of content posted on their Facebook page.50 They will be regarded as 
publishers of defamatory material made by anonymous users in two circumstances. 
The first is if they know of the defamatory statement and fail to remove it within a 
reasonable time in circumstances that give rise to an inference that they are taking 
responsibility for it. A request by the person affected is not necessary. The second is 
where they do not know of the defamatory posting but ought, in the circumstances, to 
know that postings are being made that are likely to be defamatory”.51  
                                                        
43 Sadiq v Baycorp (NZ) Ltd HC Auckland CIV 2007-404-6421, 31 March 2008 [Sadiq]. 
44 At [58]. 
45 Sadiq, above n 43, at [58]. 
46 At [54]. 
47 Wishart v Murray [2013] NZHC 540 [Wishart]. 
48 At [116]. 
49 At [116]. 
50 At [117]. 
51 At [117]. 
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The second circumstance is notable, because it departs from the Byrne approach, 
adopted in Sadiq, that actual knowledge is necessary. If the defendant was not aware 
of the defamatory material, it will still be liable if it ought, in the circumstances, to 
know that postings are being made that are likely to be defamatory. It is not clear 
what kind of threshold would be required before it can be found that a defendant 
ought, in the circumstances, to know that postings are being made that are likely to be 
defamatory, but it leans closer to the strict liability origins of the tort than Sadiq does. 
The Court held that the plaintiff had a tenable case that the defendant was a 
publisher.52  
Karam v Parker (Karam)53 was also decided by Courtney J. The defendant hosted a 
Facebook page and a website; in respect of both, defamatory content had been posted 
by others. 
Courtney J affirmed her points in Wishart, including the two circumstances in which 
Facebook page hosts will be publishers of posts made by third parties.54 She held that 
the defendant, as administrator of the Facebook page, was a publisher of the 
statements.55  
Her Honour also held the defendant to be a publisher of comments by third parties 
posted on his website. 56  The defendant had control over content, and actively 
moderated it.57  
Thus online content hosts will normally be liable when they have been notified of 
defamatory material, and have the ability to remove it but fail to do so. Wishart and 
Karam suggest that a defendant can be liable even without knowledge, provided it 
ought, in the circumstances, to know that postings are being made that are likely to be 
defamatory. This departs from the English law. 
 
                                                        
52 Wishart, above n 47, at [122]. 
53 Karam v Parker  [2014] NZHC 737 [Karam]. 
54 At [13]. 
55 At [19]. 
56 At [23]. 
57 At [23]. 
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2 Liability of online search engine operators  
A search engine is an automated retrieval system that operates on keywords. It has 
pre-programmed algorithms, and produces a list of results; results are hyperlinks 
(links to other web pages), and contain “snippets” of the web pages linked to.58 
(a) England and Wales  
The English case Metropolitan International School Ltd v Designtechnica Corp 
(Metropolitan)59 held that Google Inc, as operator of its search engine, was not a 
publisher of snippets in search results.60 Eady J applied an approach he had earlier 
developed in the case of Bunt v Tilley (Bunt):61 intermediaries that only play a role of 
passive facilitator are not publishers for the purposes of defamation law.62 On the 
facts of Metropolitan, Eady J held that Google Inc had not authorised or caused the 
snippet to appear on the user’s screen in any meaningful sense;63 it had only played 
the role of facilitator,64 and there had been no human input.65  
Eady J considered it was not possible to draw a complete analogy with a website host, 
because the search engine operator cannot press a button to ensure the offending 
words will never reappear on a snippet;66 any blocking process could be evaded by 
the author simply moving the material elsewhere. 
Even after notification, Google still was not a publisher due to its lack of control.67 
In Bunt, Eady J had said there must be knowing involvement in the process of the 
publication of the relevant words.68 With only a passive role, the defendant was a 
mere conduit, and not liable.69 
                                                        
58 A v Google New Zealand Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-2780, 12 September 2012 [A v Google] 
at [7]–[10]. 
59 Metropolitan International School Ltd v Designtechnica Corp [Metropolitan]. 
60 At [124]. 
61 Bunt v Tilley [2006] EWHC 407 (QB) [Bunt]. 
62 Metropolitan, above n 59, at [36]; Bunt, above n 61, at [36]–[37]. 
63 Metropolitan, above n 59, at [51]. 
64 At [51]. 
65 At [50]. 
66 At [55]. 
67 At [124]. 
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(b) New Zealand  
In New Zealand, Google New Zealand Ltd was the defendant in the case A v Google. 
The case was ultimately decided on the basis of Google New Zealand Ltd’s status as a 
subsidiary, because it did not own or have legal control over the Google search engine 
– rather its parent Google Inc did.70 However, the Court provided some obiter dicta 
and considered that a search engine could be a publisher. 
Associate Judge Abbot considered that holding a search engine operator to be a 
publisher of snippets is consistent with the broad common law definition of 
“publication” as being the communication of a statement to just one other person.71 
To hold that this does not apply when the repetition occurred without human input 
could unnecessarily confuse the law.72 His Honour said that it may be better to hold a 
search engine a publisher, but with access to the defence of innocent dissemination 
where the defendant has not received notification.73 Thus search engines could be 
liable when the hyperlink is removed but snippets continue to appear.74 
It was held that the plaintiff had a tenable case that Google was a publisher.75 But the 
case was struck out because the defendant was only a subsidiary,76 so the law as to 
whether search engines can be held liable as a publisher was not ascertained 
definitively. 
(c) Australia  
Two recent Australian decisions are inconsistent. 
In the case Trkulja v Google,77 Google search results brought up links to web pages 
and images of the plaintiff with several people associated with the Melbourne 
criminal underworld. 
                                                                                                                                                              
68 Bunt, above n 61, at [36]–[37]. 
69 At [36]. 
70 A v Google, above n 58, at [46]. 
71 At [73]. 
72 At [73]. 
73 At [73]. 
74 At [73]. 
75 At [75]. 
76 At [76]. 
77 Trkulja v Google (No 5) [2012] VSC 533 [Trkulja]. 
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Beach J held that it was open to the jury to conclude that Google intended to publish, 
even before notification, everything produced by its automated systems, which its 
employees created and allowed to operate, because Google is similar to a 
newsagent.78 His Honour, without stating that Metropolitan was decided wrongly on 
its facts, disagreed with any general rule that passive intermediaries cannot be held 
liable as publishers, because such a rule would cut across the library and newsagent 
line of cases.79 Therefore Google can be liable as a publisher, even without notice of 
the content of the material.80 
Bleyer v Google Inc81 was decided differently. McCallum J accepted evidence that 
there is no human input in the application of Google’s search engine besides the 
creation of the algorithm. In these circumstances, the judge said, performance of the 
function of the algorithm is not capable of establishing liability as a publisher at 
common law.82 She disagreed with the decision in Trkulja, and held that Google 
cannot be liable as a publisher of the results produced by its search engine, at least 
prior to notification.83 
So on the basis of Metropolitan, search engines are not publishers in England and 
Wales. But the case of A v Google opens the door for the law in New Zealand to go a 
different way, and treat search engines as publishers. This would be consistent with 
Trkulja in Australia, but inconsistent with Bleyer. One problem with the Metropolitan 
and Bleyer approach is that it renders the innocent dissemination defence redundant to 
search engine operators. The defence is intended for what are sometimes termed 
termed ‘secondary’ publishers, and operates on the premise that such passive 
defendants are publishers. I now turn to that defence. 
C Whether the defence of innocent dissemination is available to internet 
intermediaries in respect of content posted by third parties  
New Zealand’s defence of innocent dissemination is codified in s 21 of the 
Defamation Act 1992, which provides that: 
                                                        
78 Trkulja, above n 77, at [18]. 
79 At [28]. 
80 At [30]. 
81 Bleyer v Google Inc [2014] NSWSC 897. 
82 At [83]. 
83 At [83]. 
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In any proceedings for defamation against any person who has published the 
matter that is the subject of the proceedings solely in the capacity of, or as the 
employee or agent of, a processor or a distributor, it is a defence if that person 
alleges and proves— 
(a)  that that person did not know that the matter contained the 
material that is alleged to be defamatory; and 
(b)  that that person did not know that the matter was of a character 
likely to contain material of a defamatory nature; and 
(c)  that that person’s lack of knowledge was not due to any 
negligence on that person’s part. 
“Processor” is defined in s 2(1) as a person who prints or reproduces, or plays a role 
in printing or reproducing, any matter; “distributor” includes booksellers and 
librarians.84 
Section 21 has not been discussed in depth in respect of internet intermediaries, but 
was briefly considered in Karam. In relation to posts made by users of the defendant’s 
website, which the defendant moderated, Courtney J considered that the defendant did 
not fall within the scope of s 21.85 The judge presumably thought the same for posts 
made by third parties on the defendant’s Facebook page, without saying so expressly. 
Regarding the Facebook page, presumably it is because of Courtney J’s finding that 
the defendant knew that the posts on the page did, or were likely to, contain 
defamatory material. She did not provide separate reasons for her conclusion that s 21 
does not apply, and tied her analysis of the issue with the issue of whether the 
defendant was a publisher.86 
Internet intermediaries could arguably establish the defence prior to receiving 
notification of the defamatory material, but once notified it is clear that paras (a)-(c) 
cannot be satisfied. Thus the Sadiq approach to publication effectively subsumes the 
defence. Karam and Wishart move closer to strict liability, but still subsume the 
defence: whenever the defendant ought, in the circumstances, to know that postings 
are being made that are likely to be defamatory, para (c) of s 21 will not be satisfied. 
The onus is on the plaintiff to show that the defendant ought, in the circumstances, to 
know, rather than on the defendant to establish the elements of s 21. 
                                                        
84 Defamation Act 1992, s 2(1). 
85 Karam, above n 53, at [23]. 
86 At [7]-[23]. 
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The Australian case Trkulja held that, having been notified of the material, Google 
could not satisfy the requirements of the innocent dissemination defence.87 Similarly, 
in Godfrey in England it was held that the defendant could not establish the defence 
once it knew of the defamatory material and chose not to remove it. 88 
D Conclusion on the current law  
Thus the common law in New Zealand may be moving away from the United 
Kingdom’s. In particular, the Karam and Wishart decisions have said that the 
defendant’s actual knowledge of the defamatory material is unnecessary, and A v 
Google has set the path for search engines to be liable. Defendants may be able to 
avail themselves of the defence of innocent dissemination prior to notification of the 
defamatory material, but not after. 
IV Comparison with Safe Harbour Overseas  
A United Kingdom  
1 Defamation Act 2013, s 5  
Section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013 provides website operators with a safe harbour. 
It is a defence for the operator to show that it was not the operator who posted the 
statement on the operator’s website.89  
The Act does not specify whether an “operator” is someone who has control over the 
site itself or rather the specific content, but the latter is more likely,90 in line with the 
New Zealand Bill. 
The defence is defeated if the claimant shows that: it was not possible for the claimant 
to identify the person who posted the statement,91 the claimant gave the operator a 
                                                        
87 Trkulja, above n 77, at [41]. 
88 Godfrey, above n 30, at 206. 
89 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 5(2). 
90 Richard Parkes and others Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2013) [Gatley], at [6.39]. 
91 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 5(3)(a). 
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notice of complaint in relation to the statement,92 and the operator failed to respond to 
the notice of complaint in accordance with any provision contained in regulations.93 
Further details are contained separately in the Defamation (Operators of Websites) 
Regulations 2013, which prescribe the procedure operators must follow. If the 
operator has no means of contacting the poster, then it must, within 48 hours of 
receiving a notice of complaint, remove the statement.94 Otherwise, the operator must 
contact the poster within 48 hours of receiving notice.95 If the poster fails to respond, 
then the operator must remove the statement.96 If the poster responds but does not 
include all required information, or the information is obviously false, then the 
operator must remove the statement.97 If the poster responds and consents to removal, 
then the operator must remove the material.98 If the poster responds and does not 
consent to the removal of the material, then the operator must leave the content up 
and inform the complainant of that.99 If the poster consents, the operator must also 
provide the poster’s name or address to the complainant.100 
There is a different procedure when posters persistently re-post the same or similar 
material: if a notice of complaint has been received on two or more previous 
occasions, and on each occasion the material was removed, then on receipt of a 
further complaint the operator must remove the statement within 48 hours.101 There is 
no counter-notice process in this situation.  
The defence will be defeated if the claimant establishes malice on the part of the 
website operator.102 Malice should be given its common law meaning,103 specifically 
that the defendant did not believe the material published was true104 or recklessly 
failed to consider its truth or falsity.105 Thus a website operator would be liable if he 
                                                        
92 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 5(3)(b). 
93 Section 5(3)(c). 
94 Defamation (Operators of Websites) Regulations 2013 (UK), sched, para 3(1). 
95 Paragraph 2(1). 
96 Paragraph 5(1). 
97 Paragraph 6. 
98 Paragraph 7(2). 
99 Paragraph 8(2)(a). 
100 Paragraph 8(2)(b). 
101 Paragraph 9(2). 
102 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 5(11). 
103 Gatley, above n 90, at [6.40]. 
104 Horrocks v Lowe [1075] AC 135 (HL) [Horrocks] at 149-150. 
105 At 150. 
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knew the statement was false or was reckless as to whether it was true or false;106 
however, it is not clear whether failing to remove the content once notified of its 
falsity will amount to malice.107 If so, the defence will be defeated once the website 
operator is made aware of the defamatory material, even if the author is identifiable. 
Gatley suggests that this is supported by s 5’s reference to malice in regard to “the 
posting of the statement”,108 which likely means that “posting” continues while the 
statement remains on the site.109 With respect, this would undermine the defence, 
because an operator will not be a publisher until it has received notification, so the 
defence would not add anything to the existing law. 
The notice of complaint must comply with several requirements. However, it does not 
need to include anything substantive about the unlawfulness of the post, just the ways 
in which it is defamatory. Gatley has expressed concern about this, on the basis that a 
website operator should not be required to reveal the identity of the creator of the 
content nor take down the statement on the basis of “half the story”.110 However, the 
first limb of that criticism is unfounded because the operator can only reveal the 
identity of the poster if the poster consents. The second limb only applies if the poster 
cannot be contacted or fails to submit a valid counter-notice. 
2 Defamation Act 2013, s 10  
A further protection is s 10 of the Act, which says that courts do not have jurisdiction 
to hear and determine an action for defamation brought against a person who was not 
the author, editor or publisher of the statement complained of unless the court is 
satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable for an action to be brought against the 
author, editor or publisher. “Editor” means a person having editorial or equivalent 
responsibility for the content of the statement or the decision to publish it,111 and 
“publisher” means a commercial publisher who issues material containing the 
statement in the course of its business issuing material to the public.112 This section is 
not specific to internet intermediaries. 
                                                        
106 Gatley, above n 90, at [6.40]. 
107 At [6.40]. 
108 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 5(11). 
109 Gatley, above n 90, at [6.40]. 
110 At [6.40]. 
111 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 10(2); Defamation Act 1996 (UK), s 1(2). 
112 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 10(2); Defamation Act 1996 (UK), s 1(2). 
 21
The provision does not contain guidance on what constitutes “not reasonably 
practicable”. Gatley suggests that it would be “not reasonably practicable” if a 
successful claim were of no real value, for instance if the author was insolvent or was 
based in a jurisdiction in which the judgment could not be enforced.113 Another issue 
is whether the author’s refusal to allow his or her contact information to be passed on 
to the complainant will amount to “not reasonably practicable”, or whether the 
complainant would be expected to apply for a Norwich Pharmacal order. Gatley notes 
that if failure to utilise Norwich jurisdiction would prevent a claim being brought 
against a website operator, the s 5 notice procedures would be redundant, which 
Parliament presumably did not intend.114 
3 Defamation Act 2013, s 13  
It is worth mentioning s 13, which provides that, in a successful action for 
defamation, whether or not a website operator itself is liable, courts may order the 
operator to remove the statement.115 
This gives the courts a further avenue for enforcing an injunction against the author, 
by allowing it to order the website operators hosting the content to remove it. 
4 Summary  
Thus the Defamation Act 2013 essentially provides two levels of protection to online 
intermediaries. The first is contained in s 10, namely that no proceedings can be 
brought against an intermediary unless the court is satisfied that it is not reasonably 
practicable for an action to be brought against the author, editor or publisher of the 
content. If the court is so satisfied, then the second layer of protection, s 5, comes in. 
B United States  
1 Communications Decency Act 1996, s 230  
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 1996116 (CDA) provides internet 
intermediaries with immunity for content they did not create. 
                                                        
113 Gatley, above n 90, at [6.45]. 
114 At [6.45] 
115 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 13(1). 
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Prior to the CDA, the law relating to the liability of internet intermediaries for 
defamatory material created by third parties was problematic. Some cases held 
internet intermediaries to be publishers, which were liable for defamation, while 
others held them to be distributors, which were not liable. Importantly, the basis of the 
distinction was the exercise of editorial control, 117 which significantly disincentivised 
such control. Section 230 was intended to encourage editorial control, and prevent 
fear of liability as publishers.118 
Section 230 of the CDA provides: 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. 
(2) Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account 
of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content 
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described 
in paragraph (1). 
“Interactive computer service” is defined as “any information service, system, or 
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users 
to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to 
the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational 
                                                                                                                                                              
116 Communications Decency Act 47 USC § 230 [CDA]. 
117 Stratton Oakmont, Inc v Prodigy Services Co 1995 WL 323710 (NY Sup Ct 1995) at 4. 
118 Zeran v America Online, Inc 129 F 3d 327 (4th Cir 1997) [Zeran] at 331. 
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institutions”;119 and “information content provider” is defined as “any person or entity 
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information 
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service”.120 
The stated policy of the Act includes the removal of disincentives for the development 
and utilisation of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict 
their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.121 Section 
230 applies more broadly than the statutory defences of innocent dissemination in 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom;122 it also applies more broadly than the safe 
harbours contained in s 5 of the Defamation Act 2013 (UK) and cl 20 of the Harmful 
Digital Communications Bill. It applies to all providers and users of interactive 
computer services. It even operates where the provider or user is aware of the nature 
of the content it is hosting or carrying.123  
Paragraph (2) prevents intermediaries from being sued by content creators for 
removing that content. Notably, there is no notice-takedown requirement. 
The first case to authoritatively consider s 230 was Zeran v America Online, Inc 
(Zeran).124 America Online (AOL) operated a bulletin board, on which a third party 
posted defamatory material. After being notified by the plaintiff, AOL removed the 
material, but it continued to reappear. 
The plaintiff argued that s 230 affects only publisher liability, and that AOL was 
liable as a distributor of the material. The District Court considered that such liability 
was pre-empted by s 230, and the Court of Appeals upheld that decision. Chief Judge 
Wilkinson said that s 230 “creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that 
would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party 
user of the service. Specifically, s 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that 
would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role”.125 
 
                                                        
119 CDA, above n 116, s 230(f)(2). 
120 Section 230(f)(3). 
121 Section 230(b). 
122 Collins, above n 26, at [31.36]. 
123 Batzel v Smith 333 F 3d 1018 (9th Cir 2003) at 1031. 
124 Zeran, above n 118. 
125 At 330. 
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2 The effects of s 230  
The CDA applies broadly.126  In total, the defence succeeded in 64.4 per cent of 
defamation decisions. 127  The main reason for the defence failing was that the 
defendant was found to be either the source of or otherwise responsible for the 
content at issue.128 
Section 230 has not entirely frustrated plaintiffs’ relief: many plaintiffs have been 
able to sue the original authors of the content at issue, and, more importantly, in about 
half of cases the plaintiffs have succeeded in having the content removed.129  Given 
that the main motivation for plaintiffs in defamation claims is the correction of 
falsehood and its reputational consequences,130 it is significant that so many plaintiffs 
have obtained that removal. 
V Improvements to the Harmful Digital Communications Bill  
A Why a safe harbour is needed  
There are good reasons for intermediaries not to be liable for third party defamation. 
An important issue in this area of the law is freedom of expression. Different 
countries have struck the balance between right to reputation and freedom of 
expression differently: some are more pro-plaintiff, while others are more pro-
defendant.131 In enacting s 230 of the CDA, Congress considered freedom of speech 
implications and chose to immunise interactive computer service providers to avoid 
the probability of such providers restricting the number and type of messages 
posted.132  
                                                        
126 Batzel v Smith, above n 123 at 1030. 
127 David Ardia “Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary 
Immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act” (2010) 43 Loy LA L Rev 373 at 
503. 
128 At 442. 
129 At 493. 
130 Randall P Bezanson “Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight” 
(1985) 71 Iowa Law Review 226 at 228. 
131 Russell Weaver “Defamation Law in Turmoil: The Challenges Presented by the Internet” 
(2000) JILT <www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_3/weaver/> at [1]. 
132 Zeran, above n 118, at 331. 
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New Zealand has no entrenched right to freedom of expression, but does have the Bill 
of Rights Act 1990, s 14 of which provides that “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and 
opinions of any kind in any form”. 
Potential problems of search engine liability have been raised in response to Google v 
Spain, 133  which held that a European Union directive allows European Union 
residents to exercise their “right to be forgotten” online by requesting the removal of 
search engine results that are “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant.”134 To 
prevent misuse of the right, search engines must screen requests to determine whether 
they are legitimate. This is difficult due to the inherent subjectivity of what is “no 
longer relevant”, and the volume of requests that will likely be made.135 
Such problems could arise by making internet intermediaries liable for third party 
defamation. Moreover, because it is expensive and difficult for hosts, upon receiving 
a complaint, to decide whether the material is defamatory and should be taken down, 
or worth the risk of leaving it up, intermediaries are incentivised to simply remove 
content. This interferes with the author’s freedom of speech. 
A safe harbour can be a good solution. The approach in Bunt and Metropolitan, that 
Google is not a publisher because of its passiveness, may reach a good result with 
regard to search engine liability, but is inconsistent with the strict liability nature of 
the tort. The obiter statements in A v Google, and the Australian decision Trkulja are 
arguably sounder in principle. Similarly with regard to content hosts, the New 
Zealand cases Karam and Wishart go somewhat closer to the origins of the tort, but 
could also result in defendants being liable in unjust circumstances. For example, if a 
website or Facebook page receives so many comments that editorial control is not 
reasonably possible, then the operator may have no means of avoiding liability except 
by the innocent dissemination defence, prior to notification. 
So a legislative safe harbour is preferable to the disruption of existing principles of 
defamation law. 
                                                        
133 C-131/12 Google Spain v AEPD and Marion Costeja Gonzalez [2014] OJ C 212. 
134 Google Spain v AEPD and Marion Costeja Gonzalez, above n 132, at [94]. 
135 Emily Hong “Transparency and the EU’s New ‘Right to Be Forgotten’” 
<www.chillingeffects.org/weather.cgi?WeatherID=828>. 
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B Application to search engine operators  
As currently drafted, search engine operators may not be covered by the safe harbour, 
unless courts read the provisions broadly. Clause 20(1) states that “This section and 
section 20A apply to the liability of an online content host for the content of a digital 
communication posted by a person and hosted by the online content host” [emphasis 
added]. Clause 4’s definition of an online content host contains the words “…on 
which the communication is posted and accessible by the user” [emphasis added]. On 
the basis of Metropolitan, search engine operators do not host or store content,136 but 
only generate automatic search results.137 In addition, content is not posted on search 
engines. A distinction is drawn between content hosts and passive intermediaries like 
search engine operators. 
The approach in Metropolitan is based on factual inaccuracies, because it has 
subsequently been established that search engines do have control over search 
results,138 and thus the distinction is artificial. However, in any event it should be 
clarified whether search engines are covered by cl 20. 
The importance of protecting search engine operators from liability cannot be 
overstated. Search engines allow users to find and make sense of the vast amount of 
information available on the internet and direct their attention to the minute sub-set of 
information that may be of interest to them. 139  Currently more than 60 trillion 
individual web pages exist on the internet,140 so a system for sorting and searching 
those pages is crucial. 
Freedom of expression issues are particularly important in the context of search 
engine liability for third party defamation – search engines play a crucial role in 
imparting information.141 
                                                        
136 Metropolitan, above n 59, at [78]. 
137 A v Google, above n 58, at [51]. 
138 C-131/12 Google Spain v AEPD and Marion Costeja Gonzalez [2014] OJ C 212. 
139 Peter Leonard “Safe Harbors in Choppy Waters – Building a Sensible Approach to Liability of 
Internet Intermediaries in Australia” (2010-2011) 3 J Int’l Media & Ent L 221 at 227. 
140 <www.google.com/intl/en/insidesearch/howsearchworks/thestory/>. 
141 Molly Woods “Don’t be Evil: Mantra or Mask? An Analysis of Google’s Liability for Online 
Defamation” (LLB (Hons) Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 2012) at 24. 
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Thus search engine operators should be protected by cl 20, and Parliament should 
clarify whether they will be. 
C Notice and takedown regime  
At a minimum, three changes should be made to cl 20. First, the author’s personal 
information should be passed on to the complainant if the complainant requests. 
Currently the author has to provide his or her information to the host, but has the 
option of letting the host pass it on to the complainant. This potentially leaves 
complainants without a timely remedy. It is important that complainants who are 
defamed online can access a remedy, and receiving an anonymous author’s 
information, which the host will have received, directly from the host would likely be 
quicker than going through the courts to get that information. Clause 20A(1) provides 
that the District Court or High Court may order the release of the author’s 
information. Little can be said about this order, since no details are provided in the 
Act, but it would be slower and less convenient to complainants than having the 
information released to them automatically. If judges are given discretion, there could 
also be less certainty that the identity will be released. 
An advantage to giving anonymous authors that option is that it encourages free 
speech and debate, without fear of being ‘outed’. However, it is reasonably likely that 
the author’s details can be obtained either by order under cl 20A or by a Norwich 
Pharmacal order,142 so this is essentially an issue of workability. If a complainant is 
being defamed online, then the extra time it takes to obtain an order to disclose the 
author’s identity could increase the harm being done. 
Secondly, there should be the inclusion of a different procedure for repeat posters, as 
the United Kingdom now has. The Bill’s lack of any similar provision means that, in 
order to be protected, a content host must follow the full notice and counter-notice 
procedure, even in respect of content that has previously been the subject of a 
complaint. This is potentially onerous, and something similar to the United 
Kingdom’s approach would be more workable. 
                                                        
142 From which relevant District Court Rules and High Court Rules derive: A v Internet Company 
of New Zealand [2009] ERNZ 1 at [9]. 
 28
Thirdly, similar to the UK Regulations,143 the Bill should state that a counter-notice is 
not valid if a reasonable content host would consider the author’s details contained in 
the counter-notice to be obviously fake. In such a situation, the host must remove the 
material. This would disincentivise the provision of false details, and ensure that 
content is removed if the host does not have the author’s details and thus could not 
disclose them, whether directly or by court order. 
An additional improvement could be the provision for a penalty against submitting 
negligent or malicious notices, 144  in respect both the original complaint and the 
author’s counter-notice. It is foreseeable that malicious notices or counter-notices 
could be made, resulting in material wrongly being removed or left in place. This 
stems in part from the low requirements for the notices (in the case of the original 
complaint, it need only explain why the content is defamatory or objectionable and 
should otherwise be removed). Raising the threshold is one possibility, but would 
place additional responsibility on content hosts to assess the merits of a notice. Thus 
penalties against submitters of malicious notices could be a better solution. The 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (United States) provides that any person who 
knowingly makes misrepresentations in notices of copyright infringement can be 
liable for damages, including any costs and legal fees incurred by the service provider 
in removing the material.145 Such a provision would deter abuse of the safe harbour. 
The UK Act contains a further requirement before the defence is lost: that it is not 
possible to identify the person who made the statement. 146  This is host-friendly, 
because the host is not required to follow the notice procedure if the author is 
identifiable. The disadvantage to complainants will be minimal, because if the author 
is identifiable then the complainant can contact the author directly. And if the author 
refuses to remove the content, then presumably the author would not have consented 
to removal if notified by the host under the procedure. This is a good middle ground 
between a defence requiring no action by the host, such as s 230 of the CDA, and one 
requiring a procedure to be followed in every circumstance. 
                                                        
143 Defamation (Operators of Websites) Regulations 2013 (UK), sched, para 6. 
144 Richard Clayton “Judge & Jury? How ‘Notice and Take Down’ gives ISPs an unwanted role in 
applying the Law to the Internet” <www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/Judge_and_Jury.pdf> at 12. 
145 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 17 USC § 512(f). 
146 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 5(3)(a). 
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The UK Act also has the additional layer of defence in s 10, that no proceedings can 
be taken against someone who was not the author, editor or publisher of a statement 
unless it is not reasonably practicable to bring proceedings against the author, editor 
or publisher. Adopting such a defence would add further protections for content hosts, 
but some problems with s 10, raised by Gatley, would need to be ironed out. The first 
issue is whether an unsuccessful application for disclosure of the author’s details 
would be necessary before it is “not reasonably practicable” to bring proceedings 
against the author. If my first recommendation above were also followed, this would 
not be a problem because the author’s details would be passed to the complainant on 
request. Secondly, whether the author being insolvent or based in a jurisdiction where 
the judgment could not be enforced would amount to “not reasonably practicable”. In 
principle, however, such a protection would be desirable, and shift the focus of 
defamation actions away from the host and to the author. 
The UK Act states that an operator who “moderates” the statement does not lose the 
defence. 147  This appears at first to clarify the situation, but actually adds little, 
because presumably it will not extend to editing. Gatley therefore considers that, 
despite the provision, operators will likely be cautious and avoid moderation 
entirely.148 Thus, while such a provision could be added to the Bill, it should not be a 
priority. 
VI Conclusion  
The law relating to liability of internet intermediaries for third party defamation is 
relatively well settled in the United Kingdom. New Zealand law is less settled, and 
may depart from English law. The New Zealand approach is more consistent with the 
strict liability origins of the tort, but may result in liability being imposed on 
intermediaries when it would not be just to do so. The imposition of liability may also 
have a chilling effect, as intermediaries are incentivised to remove content once they 
have received a complaint, without assessing the merits of the complaint.  
The safe harbour contained in cl 20 of the Harmful Digital Communications Bill is a 
solid attempt at providing online content hosts with a further protection against 
                                                        
147 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 5(12). 
148 Gatley, above n 90, at [6.39]. 
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liability for defamatory material created by third parties. But there are clear 
deficiencies with the clause, and many improvements could be made. This paper has 
considered the United Kingdom’s Defamation Act 2013 and the United States’ 
Communications Decency Act, and has agued for changes to improve the Bill’s safe 
harbour. 
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